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Abstract: 
Creativity assessment commonly uses open-ended divergent thinking tasks. The typical methods 
for scoring these tasks (uniqueness scoring and subjective ratings) are time-intensive, however, 
so it is impractical for researchers to include divergent thinking as an ancillary construct. The 
present research evaluated snapshot scoring of divergent thinking tasks, in which the set of 
responses receives a single holistic rating. We compared snapshot scoring to top-two scoring, a 
time-intensive, detailed scoring method. A sample of college students (n = 226) completed 
divergent thinking tasks and measures of personality and art expertise. Top-two scoring had 
larger effect sizes, but snapshot scoring performed well overall. Snapshot scoring thus appears 
promising as a quick and simple approach to assessing creativity. 
 creativity | divergent thinking | validity | psychological assessment | openness to Keywords:
experience | psychology 
Article: 
Like parents, ombudsmen, and city council members, researchers are used to compromise. All 
assessment involves trade-offs between a method's evidence for validity and its cost. Many of the 
best assessment tools are costly in terms of administration time, expertise, technology, 
personnel-hours, and infrastructure. For this reason, many constructs have a range of available 
tools. A person's typical mood can be assessed with week-long experience-sampling methods or 
with brief self-report scales. Clinical symptoms can be assessed with face-to-face clinical 
interviews or with brief self-report screening scales. Even within a method, researchers can 
usually find a range of options. Personality researchers, for example, could choose the 300-item 
NEO-PI (Costa & McCrae, 1992), the 60-item FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992), a 20-item IPIP 
scale (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006), or even one of two 10-item scales (Gosling et 
al., 2003 and Rammstedt and John, 2007). 
 
The present research appraises a quick and simple method for assessing individual differences in 
creativity. Creativity research typically uses divergent thinking tasks to measure variation in 
creative abilities and potential (Kaufman et al., 2008, Plucker and Renzulli, 1999 and Runco, 
2007), but the traditional methods of coding and scoring these tasks are costly in terms of time 
and personnel. As a result, creativity is hard to include as a secondary or exploratory construct in 
a research project. We compare this brief, simple method—known as snapshot scoring—to a 
more time-consuming, detailed method (Silvia et al., 2008). If the brief method performs well, it 
may be a useful tool for researchers interested in assessing creativity. 
 
1. Major approaches to scoring divergent thinking 
Divergent thinking tasks assess creativity by asking people to generate ideas, which are then 
scored to capture variability in creativity (Plucker & Renzulli, 1999). For example, unusual uses 
tasks ask people to generate unusual uses for common objects, such as bricks, knives, boxes, 
shoes, and paper clips. Over the decades, researchers have developed many methods for deriving 
scores from these tasks (Kaufman et al., 2008). Two scoring methods—uniqueness scoring and 
subjective ratings—have been used the most extensively. 
 
1.1. Uniqueness scoring 
Uniqueness scoring, formalized by Wallach and Kogan (1965) in their landmark research, is 
straightforward. Researchers compile all of the responses to a task and then assign each response 
a 0 or a 1. If a response is literally unique—if only one person in the sample gave the response—
then it gets a 1. All other responses get 0s, regardless of how often they appeared. An appeal of 
this method is its implied definition of creativity: creative ideas are unique ideas. In this system, 
researchers focus on two scores: uniqueness (the number of unique responses) and fluency (the 
total number of responses), which indicate the quality and quantity of divergent thinking. 
 
All research is at least slightly painful, but uniqueness scoring is uniquely painful. The responses 
must be transcribed into a lexicon, which may have tens of thousands of responses. Each 
response must then be compared with each other response to see if it appears only once or not. 
Along the way, many judgment calls must be made, such as whether “a brick walkway” and “a 
brick path” are unique responses and whether incomprehensible yet unique responses (e.g., “You 
know, that thing that hangs on a tree trunk. You know what I’m talking about, right?”) deserve a 
point. 
 
Uniqueness scoring has two major problems that have motivated the development of alternative 
assessment systems. The first problem is that uniqueness scores are highly correlated with 
fluency scores. Researchers pointed this out soon after Wallach and Kogan (1965) published 
their landmark tasks and scoring methods (e.g., Clark & Mirels, 1970), and later research further 
demonstrated that uniqueness and fluency are essentially confounded (Hocevar, 1979a, Hocevar, 
1979b and Hocevar and Michael, 1979). This confounding is apparent even in the field's “gold 
standard” samples. In a reanalysis of Wallach and Kogan's data, Silvia (2008b) found a 
correlation of β = .89 between the latent fluency and uniqueness variables. In the large norm 
sample for the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 2008), fluency and uniqueness 
correlated equally highly (median r = .88). When two variables covary this strongly, it is hard to 
believe that they convey distinct information. Many contemporary researchers, in fact, use only 
the fluency scores as markers of creativity (e.g., Batey et al., 2009 and Preckel et al., 2006). 
 
The second problem is that uniqueness scores are strongly biased by sample size—as the sample 
becomes larger, creative responses become less common. Creativity thus becomes harder to 
detect, and the sample's estimated level of creativity declines, as the sample increases. In a small 
sample of 20 people, for example, most responses will be unique because the pool of responses is 
small. If 200 cases are added, however, many formerly unique responses will no longer be 
unique in the larger pool. In a huge sample, very few responses will be unique; it is theoretically 
possible, in fact, for no responses to be unique. Uniqueness scoring thus introduces a powerful 
sample dependence in its estimates of creativity, and this is bad for obvious reasons. Any 
assessment method that fares poorly in large samples is undesirable for basic research, unsuitable 
for large-scale testing programs, and unacceptable for high-stakes purposes (e.g., placement into 
gifted-education programs). 
 
1.2. Subjective ratings of responses 
A second assessment tradition uses judges to provide subjective ratings of creativity. The best-
known example is the consensual assessment technique (CAT; Amabile, 1982), which is used to 
appraise creative products. In a typical CAT study, people are asked to generate poems, collages, 
or stories; experts in the area then judge the products on various dimensions (e.g., creativity, 
technical skill) according to their personal definition of creativity (Kaufman et al., 2008). Recent 
work has loosened the classic CAT to include diverse kinds of products, raters, and judgments 
(Baer et al., 2004, Kaufman et al., 2005 and Kaufman et al., 2007). 
 
In divergent thinking research, it is difficult to conceive of what an “expert” divergent thinking 
judge would be. Instead of noted experts, stoic research assistants are usually pressed into service 
for the tedious process of rating divergent thinking responses. The responses are usually rated on 
a creative-quality scale, such as a 5-point “not at all creative” to “very creative” response format 
(Silvia et al., 2008). Unlike the CAT, which avoids training the raters, divergent thinking 
research usually provides some training, guidelines, or rubrics for judges, thus increasing 
between-judge agreement. 
 
Subjective scoring of divergent thinking tasks dates at least to Guilford's seminal research; many 
of his studies used subjective ratings of originality, remoteness, and cleverness (e.g., Christensen 
et al., 1957 and Wilson et al., 1953). Since then, many studies have used some kind of subjective 
quality rating. The most common approach is to have raters give a score to each response (e.g., 
Gilhooly et al., 2007, Harrington, 1975 and Silvia and Phillips, 2004). These scores can then be 
averaged for an overall score for the task. 
 
When scoring each response, researchers can score other features of the responses and test if 
those features covary with the creativity ratings. For example, people's later responses are 
usually more creative than their first few responses (Christensen et al., 1957), responses that 
people generated on the spot are more creative than responses retrieved from memory (Gilhooly 
et al., 2007), and the two responses that people picked as their “top two” are more creative than 
the rest (Silvia, 2008c). Responses can also be coded for their length, elaborateness, 
concreteness, cleverness, and their clustering into classes—these open-ended tasks provide a lot 
of information. 
 
2. Snapshot scoring: holistic judgments of creativity 
Subjective ratings overcome uniqueness scoring's two problems: they are not confounded with 
fluency, and they are not biased by large samples.1 They do share, however, the painfulness of 
uniqueness scoring. The responses must be entered into a database, coded for internal features 
(e.g., a response's serial position, whether a response was picked as one of the best responses), 
and then scored response by response. A large-sample study with several tasks and several raters 
can have around 50,000 ratings. Software tools—such as Pretz and Link's (2008) clever Creative 
Task Creator—can simplify the process, but based on our experience, researchers who wish to 
use subjective scoring will need at least three committed raters, several weeks for the ratings, 
thousands of milligrams of caffeine, and either an Atari 2600 or a Nintendo Wii for the lab. 
 
A simple, quick method for scoring divergent thinking tasks would thus be helpful. For many 
studies, creativity is secondary to the project, so it is inefficient to devote hundreds of personnel-
hours to coding and scoring a peripheral construct. Some researchers may lack the time or 
research infrastructure to commit to including creativity tasks in their research. One promising 
method that has appeared a few times in past research is snapshot scoring of divergent thinking 
tasks. In this method, raters view the entire set of responses and give a single holistic rating to 
the set. No internal coding or scoring is performed. For pencil-and-paper tasks, the responses can 
be scored from the handwritten sheets, thus avoiding the transcription needed for response-by-
response scoring. 
 
A few studies have explored the value of holistic scoring of divergent thinking tasks. In one 
study (Runco & Mraz, 1992), 24 adolescents completed divergent thinking tasks, and 20 college 
students rated the creativity of each set of responses. The raters used a 1–7 scale, with the 
constraint that the ratings had to approximate a normal distribution. The holistic scores had good 
reliability, but the study did not collect evidence for the scores’ validity. Moreover, the study was 
clearly preliminary, given the small sample (n = 24) and the unusually large number of raters to 
participants. 
 
In a later study, Mouchiroud and Lubart (2001) asked adults to give overall scores to divergent 
thinking sets provided by a sample of 70 children. One group of three adults scored the tasks for 
“creativity”; another group of three adults scored the tasks for “originality.” The raters used a 1–
7 scale. These scores had good internal consistency, and they covaried highly with each other (r 
= .76). No evidence for concurrent validity was collected, however. 
 
3. The present study 
Snapshot scoring is certainly quick and simple, but does it work? Past research has explored 
snapshot scoring (Mouchiroud and Lubart, 2001 and Runco and Mraz, 1992), but the evidence to 
date is clearly preliminary. There is some evidence for score reliability, but thus far there is little 
evidence for the scores’ validity. The present research evaluated the merit of snapshot scoring in 
more detail. Do the scores display acceptable levels of reliability and validity? Instead of 
appraising snapshot scoring in isolation, we compared it to an established and time-consuming 
method—top-two scoring, which transcribes and scores all responses but uses only people's best 
two responses to assess their level of creativity (Silvia et al., 2008). Directly comparing the 
evidence for methods’ validity allows researchers to estimate the likely consequences of using 
the quick snapshot scoring instead of the complicated top-two scoring. 
 
The data were taken from a large-scale project that explored creativity's relationships with 
personality, intelligence, interests, and creative accomplishments over time (Silvia, 2007, Silvia, 
2008b and Silvia et al., 2008). There is thus a broad range of constructs that can be used to 
appraise the concurrent validity of snapshot scores. In the present study, we evaluated the 
relationships between the two scoring methods and constructs related to personality (the Big Five 
domains) and expertise in the arts. By rescoring existing data, we hope to foster a cumulative and 
comparative approach to measuring creativity. Researchers interested in developing new scoring 
methods can obtain the raw data and responses and thus compare their method to both snapshot 
scoring and top-two scoring. 
 
4. Method 
4.1. Participants 
The original data set was collected as part of the Creativity and Cognition project. It consists of 
data from 226 students—178 women, 48 men—enrolled in General Psychology at the University 
of North Carolina at Greensboro. More details about the sample are available in the original 
article (Silvia et al., 2008). 
 
4.2. Procedure 
The people who participated in the study completed a wide range of tasks and self-report scales. 
 
4.2.1. Divergent thinking 
We used two unusual uses tasks—uses for a brick and for a knife—to measure creativity. 
Unusual uses tasks seem to perform better than other kinds of divergent thinking tasks (Silvia et 
al., 2008, Study 1). People were told that the tasks concerned creative thinking and that they 
should try to come up with creative responses. Instructing people to be creative expands the 
between-person variance in creativity and increases the validity of the scores (Harrington, 1975). 
They had 3 min for each task. After the task, the experimenter asked people to read their 
responses and to circle the two that they thought were their best responses. By asking people to 
be creative and allowing them to indicate their most creative responses, this method 
approximates “maximal assessment” of creativity, in which people's best level (rather than 
typical level) is assessed (Runco, 1986). 
 
All of the responses were transcribed into a database; spelling errors were silently corrected. 
Three research assistants rated each response. The responses were sorted alphabetically within 
each task, so the raters were unaware of whether a response was picked as a top-two response, 
the response's position in the set, the number of responses in the set, the person's other responses 
on the task, or any information whatsoever about the person's responses to the questionnaires and 
other tasks. Each response was rated on a 1–5 scale that ranged from “not at all creative” to 
“very creative.” Guilford's notions of creative ideas as uncommon, remote, and clever (Wilson et 
al., 1953) were used as scoring guidelines; the exact descriptions are published in an appendix to 
Silvia et al. (2008). The two tasks yielded over 3224 responses, so the group of raters provided 
9672 ratings. 
 
4.2.2. Snapshot scoring 
Three new raters conducted the snapshot scoring. These raters had not conducted the top-two 
ratings for this sample, but they had conducted top-two scoring for a different data set. After 
reviewing the scoring guidelines, the raters read and scored the divergent thinking tasks directly 
from the original response sheets. The raters were thus aware of peripheral information (e.g., 
handwriting, any spelling errors, whether the participant used a sparkly lavender gel pen) as well 
as task-relevant information (e.g., number and serial order of responses, which responses were 
circled as top-two responses), but they were unaware of all responses to the other questionnaires 
and tasks. Each sheet—each set of responses—was given a single number. The raters used a 1–5 
scale that ranged from “not at all creative” to “very creative.” The group of raters provided 1356 
scores, around 14% of the amount required for the top-two scoring method. 
 
4.2.3. Personality 
We measured the Big Five personality domains with 3 scales: the 60-item Five Factor Inventory 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992), a 50-item International Personality Item Pool scale (Goldberg et al., 
2006), and a 10-item brief scale (Gosling et al., 2003). Each item used a 5-point response format. 
 
4.2.4. Art expertise 
We assessed people's expertise in the arts two ways. First, we used Smith and Smith's (2006) 
aesthetic fluency scale, a 10-item self-report scale that measures people's knowledge of figures 
and terms from art history. People indicate how familiar they are with the person or term on a 5-
point scale. To expand the scale's content, we added five items related to creative writing and 5 
items related to the decorative arts. Although new, this scale has performed well in several 
studies (Silvia, 2007, Silvia and Barona, 2009 and Smith and Smith, 2006). 
 
Second, we classified each student's major as a creative college major (scored as 1) or a 
conventional college major (scored as 0). About 9% of the sample had a creative major (e.g., fine 
arts, interior architecture, music performance). Although coarse, this scoring broadly captures 
whether students have creative goals, career aspirations, and occupational interests (see Silvia et 
al., 2008, for details). 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Model specification and analytic method 
We used Mplus 5.2 for all analyses. The models were estimated with full-information maximum 
likelihood with robust standard errors (MLR). Few observations were missing; most analyses 
had no missing data, and the matrix cells with the most missing data were nevertheless 99.1% 
complete. 
 
For snapshot scores, we specified creativity as a higher order latent variable defined by lower 
order brick and knife variables. The variance of creativity was fixed to 1, and the paths to brick 
and knife were constrained to be equal for identification. For the brick and knife variables, the 
paths to the three raters’ scores were the indicators; the brick and knife variances were fixed to 1. 
The raters’ scores were modeled as ordered-categorical (ordinal) variables: they were highly 
skewed, and some response options (4 and 5) were rarely chosen by the raters. (Readers familiar 
with item-response theory will recognize this as a graded response model for polytomous 
outcomes.) Modeling the snapshot ratings as ordinal only trivially changed the effects, but it did 
restrict the kinds of model fit statistics that could be reported (see Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 
2004, for details on generalized CFA models). 
 
The faceted structure of the snapshot scoring—three raters crossed with two tasks—and the 
ordinal nature of the ratings make conventional reliability indices (e.g., Cronbach's alpha) 
inappropriate. Nevertheless, an analogous statistic for latent variable models is maximal 
reliability (Drewes, 2000), which represents “the degree to which the indicators can capture 
information about the underlying factor” (Gagné & Hancock, 2006, p. 68). The higher order 
creativity variable (H = .83) and the lower order brick (H = .84) and knife (H = .88) variables 
displayed good reliability. 
 
For top-two scores, we used the same model specification that we used in past work (Silvia, 
2008a and Silvia et al., 2008). Creativity was a higher order latent variable indicated by lower 
order brick and knife variables. The variance of creativity was fixed to 1, and the paths were 
constrained to be equal for identification. For brick and knife, the three raters’ scores were the 
indicators. The paths to Rater 2 were fixed to 1, and the paths for Raters 1 and 3 were 
constrained to be equal because they were very similar. This model fit well: CFI = .990, RMSEA 
= .034, SRMR = .050. 
 
5.2. Personality and creativity 
For the personality model, we estimated the effects of the Big Five variables on snapshot scores 
and top-two scores. The Big Five variables were modeled as latent variables; the three scales 
were the indicators, and the path to the IPIP scale was fixed to 1. Table 1 depicts the 
standardized effects, which can be interpreted as effect sizes, and their confidence intervals; 
Table 2 depicts the variance explained. Note that the top-two effects appeared in Silvia et al. 
(2008, Study 2).2 
Table 1. Summary of effects for snapshot scores and top-two scores. 
Model Snapshot scores 
 
Top-two scores 
 
 β CI β CI 
Personality model 
 Neuroticism −.041 −.220 to .138 .026 −.212 to .264 
 Extraversion −.153 −.333 to .028 −.054 −.361 to .253 
 Openness to experience .330 .131 to .528 .578 .245 to .910 
 Agreeableness .081 −.096 to .258 .242 −.013 to .497 
 Conscientiousness −.288 −.469 to −.108 −.461 −.736 to −.186 
 Art expertise model 
 Aesthetic fluency .090 −.080 to .261 .132 −.132 to .396 
 Creative college major .974 .538 to 1.409 1.664 .828 to 2.501 
Note: n = 226. The coefficients are standardized regression weights, which represent effect sizes. 
CI = 95% symmetric confidence intervals around β. The coefficient for Creative College Major, 
a binary predictor, is Y-standardized: it is the standard deviation change in the outcome when the 
predictor shifts from 0 to 1 (Long, 1997). 
Table 2. Summary of variance explained in creativity scores. 
 Snapshot scores Top-two scores 
Personality model 15.5% 48.3% 
Art expertise model 8.8% 26.6% 
 
The snapshot scores performed well: they were significantly predicted by openness to experience 
and conscientiousness, two variables that consistently appear in research. As in past research, 
openness and conscientiousness had opposite effects on creativity (Batey and Furnham, 2006 and 
Feist, 1998). Nevertheless, the effects for the top-two scores were larger. Overall, the Big Five 
explained a lot of variance in snapshot scores (15.5%) but much more in top-two scores (48.3%). 
 
5.3. Art expertise and creativity 
Our next model examined art expertise, assessed by aesthetic fluency scores and people's college 
majors. We modeled aesthetic fluency as a latent variable indicated by the three subscales (fine 
arts, creative writing, and decorative arts); the path to the fine arts variable was fixed to 1. Table 
1 depicts the effects. Aesthetic fluency had only a small effect on both snapshot scores and top-
two scores, although the effect size was larger for top-two scores. 
 
Having a creative college major, in contrast, had a large effect on creativity. Because the 
predictor is binary, the coefficient is Y-standardized (Long, 1997): it shows the standard 
deviation change in the outcome when the predictor shifts from 0 (conventional major) to 1 
(creative major). For snapshot scoring, the coefficient of .97 means that people with conventional 
and creative majors differed in creativity by about 1 standard deviation. For top-two scoring, the 
effect was much larger: people with conventional and creative majors differed in creativity by 
about 1.7 standard deviations. 
 
6. General discussion 
Creativity assessment is time-consuming. Researchers who study creativity cannot complain—it 
is what they signed up for, and many constructs are harder to assess than creativity. The problem, 
however, is that researchers interested in other topics are discouraged from including creativity 
as an ancillary, secondary, or exploratory construct. The commitment of time and personnel is a 
big barrier to exploring creativity's relationships with a wide network of other constructs; this 
ultimately stunts the growth of knowledge in the field. It would thus be nice to have a simpler 
and faster method of creativity scoring, one that strikes an appropriate balance between 
convenience and psychometric effectiveness. 
 
The present research explored snapshot scoring—giving a holistic rating to a set of divergent 
thinking responses—as a quick and simple method. Overall, this method appears promising. 
First, the factor structure of the snapshot scores showed good construct reliability (Drewes, 
2000)—all of the H values were over .80, so good score reliability was achieved with only three 
raters and two tasks. Second, good evidence for concurrent validity was found. Snapshot scores 
covaried positively with openness to experience and people's college majors; they covaried 
negatively with conscientiousness, thus replicating much past research ( Batey and Furnham, 
2006 and Feist, 1998). 
 
At the same time, top-two scoring—the more complex, costly, and time-consuming method—
generally performed better than the quick and simple snapshot method. More variance was 
accounted for in top-two scores than in snapshot scores. It is reassuring, in a sense, that the 
tedious yet detailed method generally performed better—this shows that there is merit in taking 
the extra time and effort to score the tasks more precisely. Furthermore, snapshot scoring does 
not afford testing certain kinds of hypotheses, such as hypotheses about the order or clustering of 
responses. Researchers interested in internal features of the responses must score each response 
individually. 
 
By comparing the two scoring methods, we can illuminate the nature of the compromise between 
convenience and psychometric effectiveness. For example, openness to experience predicted 
both snapshot scores and top-two scores, but it predicted top-two scores much more strongly. For 
studies of personality, it seems that the extra effort is justified. For art expertise, in contrast, 
researchers may believe that gain in effect size is not worth the larger cost in time and effort. 
Such decisions are subjective, but they can be informed by comparative studies of validity. We 
encourage future researchers to score their data according to several methods—or to rescore the 
responses used in this research—thus fostering a cumulative literature on the effectiveness of 
creativity assessment. 
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1 As an aside, subjective ratings of creativity could in principle meet the Rasch ideal of “specific 
objectivity,” in which trait estimates are independent of the tasks and items used to measure the 
trait. Approximating scores with specific objectivity would probably require a multidimensional 
item response model that separated the influence of raters from the influence of the latent 
creativity trait. Because of their unusual sample dependence, uniqueness scores cannot in 
principle achieve specific objectivity. 
2 Fastidious readers will notice some small differences in the effects reported here and the 
effects reported earlier. For the personality models, a few top-two effects differ trivially because 
the Silvia et al. (2008) analyses used simple maximum likelihood (ML) estimation. 
